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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating
to, oil, gas, and mineral law in Texas from November 2, 2006
through November 1, 2007. The cases examined include decisions
of state and federal courts in the State of Texas and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.1
II. TITLE AND CONVEYANCING ISSUES
Ford v. ExxonMobil Chemical Co.2 examines whether limitations
should bar an equitable action to quiet title. Five years after signing an
amendment granting a pipeline easement across three tracts of land, Ford
sued ExxonMobil for real estate fraud and to quiet title by a removal
order.3 Ford alleged that he only signed the amendment because Exx-
onMobil represented that the original pipeline easement covered all three
tracts; but in actuality, it only covered one tract.4 The Texas Supreme
Court held that the statute of limitations precluded both Ford's fraud
claim and his equitable claim for quiet title.5
*Attorney at Law, Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas.
** Attorney at Law, Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas.
1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas and mineral law, decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states, are
not included.
2. 235 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. 2007).
3. Id. at 616-17.
4. Id. at 616.
5. Id. at 619.
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The parties agreed that the fraud claim should have been brought
within four years of when a person exercising reasonable diligence should
have discovered the fraud, but they disagreed as to when the fraud should
have been discovered.6 The supreme court recognized the general rule
that not all public records establish an irrebuttable presumption of notice,
but when the recorded instrument is in the grantee's chain of title, public
records generally do establish an irrebuttable presumption of notice.7 In
the present case, Ford's fraud claim was based on recorded instruments in
his chain of title, which were recorded prior to the amendment he exe-
cuted.8 Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run no later than
the moment when Ford signed the amendment, because the recorded in-
struments in his chain of title placed him on constructive notice of the
alleged fraud. Ford did not claim, plead, or try to prove that there was a
fiduciary relationship with ExxonMobil. 9
In holding that the suit to quiet title was also barred, the Texas Su-
preme Court first pointed out that Ford did not plead quiet title as an
independent cause of action. Therefore, "[h]aving asserted limitations
against Ford's fraud claim, ExxonMobil did not have to assert limitations
against each item of legal or equitable relief that stemmed from it."' 10
But even if Ford had pled quiet title as an independent cause of action,
it still would have been barred. Although it is true that "an equitable
action to remove cloud on title is not subject to limitations if a deed is
void or has expired by its own terms,"1 1 this rule does "not apply when a
deed is voidable rather than void."1' 2 When a deed is voidable, the claim-
ant has an adequate remedy at law, and equity will not intervene.
13
In this case, Ford claimed that the deed was obtained by fraud. "Deeds
obtained by fraud are voidable rather than void, and remain in effect un-
til set aside."'14 Once limitations expired for setting aside the deed alleg-
edly obtained by fraud, Ford could not simply evade this bar by asserting
the claim in equity. The supreme court recognized that if it were to hold
otherwise, virtually every real estate case "could be recast as an action to
remove cloud on title," and limitations would rarely apply.1
5
Hamilton v. Morris Resources, Ltd.16 is a mineral/royalty deed-con-
struction case. The case examines a series of original deeds, leases, and a
correction deed, which can be simplified for purposes of review as: (1) an
original deed executed in 1926 subject to an existing lease providing for a
6. Id. at 617.
7. Id. at 617.
8. Id. at 616, 618.
9. Id. at 618.
10. Id. at 618-19.
11. Id. at 618 (citing Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. 1941); Tex. Co. v.
Davis, 254 S.W. 304, 309 (Tex. 1923)).
12. Id. (citing Pure Oil Co. v. Ross, 111 S.W.2d 1076, 1078 (Tex. 1938)).
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tex. 1976)).
15. Id.
16. 225 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. denied).
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1/8 royalty (the Original Deed); (2) a correction deed, executed in 1932 to
clarify "ambiguities" in the Original Deed (the Correction Deed), and (3)
a new lease providing for a 1/4 royalty.17 In the 1926 Original Deed, John
and Matilda Richardson granted to George H. Coates the following:
•.. 1/4th interest in and to all the oil, gas, and other minerals in and
under and that may be produced from the following described
lands...
[t]ogether with the right of ingress and egress at all times for the
purpose of mining, drilling, and exploring said lands for oil, gas and
other minerals, and removing the same therefrom.
And said described lands being now under an oil and gas lease. . ., it
is understood and agreed that this sale is made subject to said lease,
but covers and includes 1/4th of all the oil royalty and gas rental or
royalty due and to be paid under the terms of said lease.
It is agreed and understood that 1/32 of the money rentals which may
be paid to extend the term within which a well may be begun under
the terms of said lease is to be paid to the said [Coates], and in the
event that the said above described lease for any reason becomes
cancelled or forfeited, then and in that event, the lease interests and
all future rentals on said land, for oil, gas, and mineral privileges
shall be owned jointly by the undersigned [Richardson] owning 31/32
and [Coates] owning 1/32 interest ... in all oil, gas and other miner-
als in and upon said land, together with their interest in all future
rentals. 18
The Correction Deed provided:
[T]he mineral deeds in favor of [Coates] executed by [the Richard-
sons] are hereby amended such that said mineral deeds cover and
include an undivided one-fourth (1/4th) interest in the minerals
under the above described property, being one-thirty-second (1/
32nd) of the gross production for a perpetual term, which interest,
however, shall not be participating as to delay rentals payable under
the outstanding lease nor as to delay rentals or cash bonuses payable
under the future leases ....
It is further.., agreed.., that the joinder of... [Coates] ... shall
not be necessary in future leases, provided, however, that . . . [the
Richardsons] ... shall execute no oil, gas and mineral leases on the
above described land providing for a royalty of less than one-eight
[sic] (1/8th) .... 19
In 1999, the property was leased for a one-fourth royalty.20 Richardson
claimed Coates was entitled to receive one-fourth of any royalty pay-
ments under the leases in effect at the time of the Original Deed, but that
Coates had a lesser interest in future leases. 21 Richardson interpreted the
deeds as conveying to Coates: (1) a one-fourth royalty interest and one-
17. Id. at 340.
18. Id. at 341 (quoting the Original Deed) (court's alteration).
19. Id. at 342 (quoting the Correction Deed).
20. Id. at 340.
21. Id. at 342.
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thirty-second of all delay rentals under the leases in effect at the time of
the original grant and (2) a one-thirty-second possibility of reverter.22
Richardson also claimed that because Coates was not expressly granted
the right to receive royalties under future leases, Coates's royalty interest
must be commensurate with his mineral interest, one-thirty-second.
2 3
Thus, Richardson maintained that under the most recent lease, Coates
owned a one-thirty-second mineral interest (1/128th of production), or,
alternatively, a fixed one-thirty-second nonparticipating royalty (one-
thirty-second of production).2 4 Coates claimed a one-fourth mineral in-
terest (one-sixteenth of production). 25
The court gave weight to the language in the Original Deed that the
interest conveyed was a one-fourth interest "in and under and that may
be produced. ' 26 The "in and under" language usually refers to a mineral
interest.27 The Correction Deed recited that the intention of the parties
was to convey a "one-fourth (1/4th) interest in the minerals." 28
The court held that "no language in any of the deeds divest[ed] Coates
of his 1/4 [sic] mineral interest. '2 9 Further, the provision in the Correction
Deed prohibiting Richardson from entering into any lease for less than a
one-eighth royalty ensured Coates that his interest would never fall be-
low a minimum of one-thirty-second of gross production. 30 The court
said that interpreting Coates's interest as a fixed one-thirty-second of
production would render the restriction placed on Richardson
meaningless.3 1
Richardson also argued that the Correction Deed transformed Coates's
mineral interest into a royalty interest.32 Coates had the right to receive
delay rentals under the Original Deed, but the Correction Deed provided
for no delay rentals or bonuses. 33 Richardson claimed that this change
transformed Coates's present possessory interest into a non-participating
royalty interest.34 The court concluded, however, that if Richardson had
intended to transform Coates's mineral interest into a fixed royalty inter-
est, it would have been unnecessary for Richardson to reserve the right to
receive delay rentals and bonuses.35 The grant of a fixed royalty interest
does not convey an interest in delay rentals, bonus payments, or execu-
tive rights.3 6 Thus, the court held that Richardson conveyed to Coates a
22. Id. at 342-43.








31. Id. at 344.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 344-45.
34. Id. at 345.
35. Id. at 345.
36. Id. (citing French v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 896 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Tex. 1995)).
[Vol. 61
Oil, Gas and Mineral Law
one-fourth mineral interest, not a fixed royalty interest.37
The significance of the case is the continuing trend to reject the "two-
grant theory" in favor of a "four corners" construction harmonizing in-
struments in which multiple fractions are used. While any particular case
may be difficult to harmonize, the reality is that rarely would any party to
these kinds of deeds intend anything other than a simple, single grant.
That is, while rights to delay rentals, bonus, access, and to lease have been
frequently negotiated, the quantum of interest is generally not expressed
as a present interest and as a future interest with a different magnitude.
Hamilton v. Hamilton38 held that a grant conveying fifteen percent of
"all rights" owned, save and except listed burdens, was not free from un-
listed burdens.39 Richardson conveyed land to George Hamilton reserv-
ing a non-participating royalty interest. George and Sharon Hamilton,
while married, conveyed the same interest to Hamilton-Encinos Miner-
als, Ltd., a partnership owned by the couple. 40 The deed conveyed "....
all rights, title and interest in our oil, gas, other minerals, royalties, rentals
and executive leasing privileges in, on, and under and appurtenant to [the
real property] subject to all valid and subsisting restrictions, conditions,
easements, mineral reservations, leases and other documents of record
.... "41 Later in the same year, George and Sharon divorced.42 Per the
divorce settlement agreement, Hamilton-Encinos conveyed to Sharon:
... subject to the reservations herein after set out, an undivided fif-
teen (15%) percent of all of the mineral interests (including delay
rentals, royalties and other benefits hereafter accruing under each
currently existing, valid and subsisting Oil, Gas and/or Mineral
Lease) conveyed to Hamilton-Encinos Minerals, Ltd ...save and
except all executive leasing rights which are reserved by
Grantor .... 43
George claimed that Sharon's interest was limited by all restrictions,
exceptions, and reservations burdening the Hamilton-Encinos interest,
including Richardson's non-participating royalty interest. He argued that
because the Hamilton-Encinos interest was burdened by all documents of
record, Sharon's interest was similarly burdened. Sharon argued that be-
cause her deed did not expressly subject her interest to other interests of
record, and because the only exception related to the executive rights, she
held a net fifteen percent interest, not restricted by other reserved
interests.4
4
37. Hamilton, 225 S.W.3d at 345.
38. No. 04-06-00046-CV, 2006 WL 3612876 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Dec. 13, 2006,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
39. Id. at *1-2.
40. Id. at *1.
41. Id. (quoting the deed language) (court's alteration with emphasis added by
author).
42. Id.
43. Id. at *1-2 (quoting the divorce agreement).
44. Id. at *3.
2008]
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The court held: "In its plainest terms, the Divorce Deed language
grants Sharon an undivided [fifteen percent] of whatever mineral inter-
ests Hamilton-Encinos received under the 2000 conveyance from George
and Sharon.'45 Therefore, Sharon only received fifteen percent in the
mineral interest actually owned by Hamilton-Encinos.46 The opinion is
silent, but presumably the Divorce Deed was without warranty. Even if
the Divorce Deed was with warranty, the same result may have followed,
because fifteen percent of "all rights owned" is not a conveyance of a
specific fixed interest.
The significance of the case is that a conveyance of fifteen percent of
"all rights owned," save and except listed rights, does not make the grant
free of its proportionate part of unlisted burdens.
Moon Royalty, LLC v. Boldrick Partners47 held that a conveyance of
the wells and lands described in an attachment to the assignment labeled
"Exhibit A" included two wells which were not listed in the exhibit but
were located on the lands described therein.48 Statewide, as assignor, ex-
ecuted an assignment and an amended assignment to Moon, as assignee,
which provided:
Assignor does hereby Transfer, Assign, Convey, and Deliver unto
Assignee all of Assignors royalty, overriding royalty and associated
mineral interests as specifically described on Exhibit "A" (hereinaf-
ter called "Interests") in and to the oil and gas wells described
therein (hereinafter called "Properties") and in and to the lands
(hereinafter called "Lands"). It is specifically understood between
Assignor and Assignee that Assignor may own other interest in the
Properties which are not intended to be covered by this Assignment
and such Interest are specifically excluded herefrom.4 9
The italicized language did not appear in the original assignment. Ex-
hibit A to the assignment consisted of a table with the following headings:
Assignor; Assignee; Date; Description; County; State; Well; Name; RI;
ORRI; Book; Page.5 0
As to each listed interest in the Statewide to Moon assignment, there
was also a description of the conveyance into Statewide.5 1
The dispute involved two wells which were not listed by name on Ex-
hibit A, but the land on which the wells were located was listed on Ex-
hibit A.5 2 Statewide argued that no interest was conveyed in the two
wells and contended that the additional language in the amendment was
only added to address Moon's concern that the assignment could be con-
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 244 S.W.3d 391 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, no pet.).
48. Id. at 396.
49. Id. at 392-93 (quoting the assignment) (court's emphasis).
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strued as a borehole assignment. 53 Moon agreed that the concern over a
borehole assignment was an issue, but argued that Statewide represented
that the assignment included all revenues attributable to the lands cov-
ered by any listed interest.
54
The Eastland Court of Appeals held that the assignment was not am-
biguous, ignored parole evidence, and construed the assignment.55 State-
wide contended that because the granting clause was limited to the
interests "as specifically described on Exhibit 'A"' and because the clause
referenced the possibility that Statewide might own other interest in "the
Properties which are not intended to be covered by this Assignment," the
amended assignment covered only royalty interests in the listed wells.
56
Statewide argued that "if the assignment covered all of its interests in a
particular tract, then there would be no reason to describe the specific
fractional interests Moon was to receive or to describe the specific wells
included. 57
The court held that Statewide's interpretation would render meaning-
less the additional language in the amended assignment defining
"Lands."'58 The court noted that the granting clause originally contained
two defined terms: "Interests" and "Properties. '59 "Because Lands was a
separately defined term, and because Statewide conveyed its interests in
both the Properties and the Lands, the term Lands must refer to some-
thing other than the listed wells to have any meaning."'60 Thus, "utilizing
the plain meaning of the word land, and looking at the four corners of the
corrected assignments, this term necessarily refers to the tracts described
by block and section in Exhibit A."61 Therefore, Statewide conveyed a
royalty interest in the listed acreage, whether a well was present or not.
62
"The reference [in the assignment] to other interests Statewide might
own was limited to other interests Statewide might own in the 'Proper-
ties." 63 Thus, because "'Properties' was defined as the oil and gas wells
listed on Exhibit A, the reference to other interests owned simply indi-
cated that Statewide might own other interests in the described wells."
'64
The court held that the provision therefore had "no bearing on the mean-
ing of the term Lands."'65
Statewide also argued that it would be impossible to determine what
fractional interest Moon received under the court's interpretation of the
53. Id. at 394 n.3.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 394-95.












assignment. But the court rendered judgment that Moon acquired State-
wide's interest in the two wells to the extent of the fractional interest
listed for the tracts upon which the wells were located. However, the
interest was limited to the extent that the interest was acquired by State-
wide in a conveyance listed on Exhibit A to the amended assignment and
by the percentage of ownership listed on Exhibit A for that conveyance. 66
Broesche v. Jacobson6 7 held that "working interest" and "leasehold in-
terest" did not necessarily have the same meaning. 68 In this case, the text
described the interest to be transferred as "[o]ne-half of all oil and gas
interests of the parties as described on Exhibit A."'69 The parties then
described fifty wells on Exhibit A to their agreement in a format similar
to the following:70
County Well WI% NRI% Status
Calhoun Fredrich #1 0.333333 0.249998 A
It was undisputed that "WI%" meant working interest percentage, but
the parties disputed whether the interest to be conveyed was an interest
in the fifty specific wells listed in Exhibit A, or in the underlying
leasehold. 71
Although the Fourteenth District Houston Court of Appeals noted
there was strong authority holding that the term working interest when
used in its technical sense refers to a leasehold interest,72 terms such as
"working interest" are used loosely and inaccurately. 73 Sometimes
"working interest" denotes merely an interest in mineral rights, or a per-
centage of the mineral interest granted. Under the facts of this case, the
court held that it could not determine whether the parties intended to use
the term in its technical sense or more loosely, and that the description
was ambiguous, even though the parties were both geologists. 74
Exhibits similar to the one in this case, either in chart form, or as a
computer printout, are common. This case highlights the importance of
the text of the agreement or deed in defining the interest to be conveyed,
when the property description on the attached exhibit is limited. The text
of an agreement or deed usually has an elaborate description of the prop-
erty rights to be conveyed. This almost always includes (as a minimum) a
conveyance of property rights expressly described as "the leases on Ex-
hibit A" or as a "leasehold interest in the leases on Exhibit A." Broesch
held that "working interest" alone is not necessarily a definitive term.
66. Id. at 396.
67. 218 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
68. Id. at 273.
69. Id. at 272 (quoting the divorce decree document governing the transfer).
70. Id. at 272 n.1.
71. Id. at 272.
72. Id. at 273 n.3.
73. Id. at 273 (internal citation omitted).
74. Id.
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Moon Royalty held that an assignment of a royalty interest in the "lands"
described on Exhibit A will also catch any wells on the lands, whether the
wells are listed or not.
Bowers v. Taylor 75 held that the terms of a mineral deed convey a pres-
ently vested interest in the possibility of reverter under an oil and gas
lease, rather than a springing executory interest that would violate the
rule against perpetuities. Both the lease and the mineral deed were exe-
cuted about eighty years ago, when the fundamental nature of property
rights in oil and gas were not fully developed and certainly not fully un-
derstood as it is today. The lease and the deed (which incorporated the
lease) were created by the same parties. "When two instruments involve
the same parties and relate to the same transaction, [the court] read[s] the
documents together in order to ascertain the parties' intent. ' 76 In 1919,
Taylor's predecessors in interest, as lessor, granted the lease to Bowers's
predecessors in interest, as lessee. The lease provided that it would last
"so long as such mineral or minerals can be produced in paying
quantities. 7 7
In 1927, Taylor's predecessors, as grantor, conveyed a mineral interest
to Bowers' predecessors, as grantee. The conveyance provided that "if
said lease should be forfeited, then ... [Bowers] is to become vested with
one-third (1/3) interest in the fee title in and to the oil, gas and minerals
in all portions of said above described tracts . . . . 78
Production under the lease ended in 1988, but in 2002 production was
obtained under new leases from Taylor and Bowers.79 Taylor and Bowers
disputed the allocation of production between them based on the 1927
conveyance. Taylor asserted that the purported transfer of a one-third
interest to Bowers violated the rule against perpetuities. Taylor asserted
alternatively that the lease was never "forfeited," but terminated for lack
of production, and thus the condition precedent to Bowers's ownership
had not occurred.8 0
The court held that the deed conveyed a one-third interest in the possi-
bility of reverter under the lease, which was a present conveyance that
did not violate the rule against perpetuities, and that by the use of the
word "forfeiture," the parties intended to include the termination of the
lease due to cessation of production. 81 "An oil and gas lease is not a
typical lease ... [because] the lessor (actually a grantor) grants a mineral
interest in fee simple determinable to the lessee (actually a grantee). 8 2
"[U]pon termination of the 'lease,' the mineral estate reverts to the grant-
75. No. 01-05-00667-CV, 2007 WL 1299440, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May
3, 2007, no pet.).
76. Id. at *4.
77. Id. at *1 (quoting the lease language).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at *2 (quoting the conveyance language).
81. Id. at *5, *7.




ors of the lease, their heirs, or their assigns," which is the possibility of
reverter. 83 The lessor, or grantor, "may sell or assign the possibility of
reverter. 8
4
As applied in Texas, the rule against perpetuities provides that "an in-
terest is not valid unless it must vest, if at all, within [twenty-one] years
after the death of some life or lives in being at the time of the convey-
ance. ' 85 The court compared and distinguished between two leading
Texas Supreme Court opinions. In Peveto v. Starkey,86 the supreme court
held that a conveyance violated the rule which provided: "This grant shall
become effective only on the expiration of the above described Royalty
Deed. ' 87 In Jupiter Oil v. Snow, 88 the supreme court held that a convey-
ance did not violate the rule which provided: "[I]n the event the lease
now on said land is forfeited or terminated withou[t] producing mineral
of any kind, then . . ." and "it is the intention of the grantors herein that
in the event said lease is forfeited, then . "..."89 In Bowers, the supreme
court found that Peveto was distinguishable because in Peveto, the con-
veyance itself was delayed and there was no further explanation of grant-
ors' intent.90 To the contrary, the Taylor-to-Bowers deed was a present
conveyance, the habendum clause included an expression of intent, and
the habendum clause did not mention any delay. Applying the "four cor-
ners" rule and construing the lease and deed together, there was no viola-
tion of the rule against perpetuities. 91
Again guided by the intent of the parties and construing both instru-
ments together, the court found the term "forfeit" should be read broadly
to include automatic termination.92 Thus, the parties intended "to trans-
fer a possibility of reverter, which takes effect at the termination of the
lease for any reason, including cessation of production. ''93
The significance of the case is that once again, Peveto is distinguished
and found not to be controlling. In the context of an industry accustomed
to dealing with interests which revert after decades, parties generally do
not expect that their property rights will be derailed by a rule that is
rarely given serious thought. The case also illustrates a serious trend to
reinvigorate the "four corners" rule and to consider multiple documents
together when they constitute a single transaction. Under today's prac-
tice of complex purchase and sale agreements, this suggests that unless
limited by agreement to the contrary, deeds may be construed by refer-
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991)).
85. Id. at *3.
86. 645 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1982).
87. Id. at 771 (quoting the habendum language).
88. 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991).
89. Id. at 468 (quoting the habendum language).
90. Bowers, 2007 WL 1299440, at *5.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *7.
93. Id.
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ence to other documents that have not been carefully considered as to
how they might relate to deed construction.
III. LEASE AND LEASING ISSUES
Humble Woods, L.L.C. v. Petrohawk Energy Corp.94 held that a Texas
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to determine rights to an oil
and gas lease in Louisiana.95 The core issue in the lawsuit was the owner-
ship of a mineral servitude, which is "the right of enjoyment of land be-
longing to another for the purpose of exploring for and producing
minerals and reducing them to possession and ownership. ' 96 The court
held that:
Texas courts may not adjudicate title to realty in another state or
country; they do not have subject matter jurisdiction over property
outside the state. . . .The general prohibition against determining
rights in real property located in other states or countries extends to
rights in oil and gas leases in other states or counties .... It follows
that the prohibition also extends to mineral servitudes.
97
Sun-Key Oil Co. v. Whealy9 8 held that lease which is void because of an
inadequate legal description can be neither revised or ratified. 99 Gray
leased land described as "'150 acres of land out of the S/2 of the John
Hibbins Survey"' to Sun-Key (the Gray Lease). Whealy acquired Gray's
mineral interest by a deed "subject to" the Gray Lease. Whealy filed suit
for a declaratory judgment that the Gray Lease was void due to an inade-
quate legal description. Gray and Sun-Key then amended the Gray
Lease to correct the legal description. Sun-Key contended the amended
lease description was good and that Whealy could not contest the validity
of the Gray Lease under the doctrines of revivor and ratification. 100
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals concluded that the description in the
lease identifying the leased property as some of the acreage out of a
larger tract did not comply with the statute of frauds and was void. 10 1
Further, because the lease amendment was executed by Gray after the
conveyance of Gray's interest to Whealy, it was therefore not binding on
Whealy.10 2 A revivor may save a terminated lease, but only when there is
a termination of a grant which was originally effective.'0 3 Revivor did
94. No. 05-06-01623-CV, 2007 WL 3072908 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 23, 2007, no pet.)(mem. op.).
95. Id. at *2.
96. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:21 (2000).
97. Humble Woods, L.L.C., 2007 WL3072908, at *2 (quoting Trute Oil & Gas, Inc. v.
Atlas Int'l Inc., 194 S.W.3d 580, 583 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.)).
98. No. 2-06-198-CV, 2006 WL 3114466 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, Nov. 2, 2006, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
99. Id. at *3.
100. Id. at *2.
101. Id. at *3.




not apply here because the Gray Lease was void from its inception. 104
The court determined that Sun-Key's defense could only be ratification
and not revivor. 105 A recital that a deed is "subject to" some other docu-
ment (here the Gray Lease) limits the grantor's warranty and makes the
grant subservient to the document named, but does nothing to create af-
firmative rights.10 6 If the Gray Lease had been valid, then Whealy would
take subject to whatever limitation the Gray Lease imposed on the ti-
tle.10 7 Here, the question was whether Whealy ratified the void lease by
accepting the deed "subject to" the Gray Lease.1 08 The court held
Whealy could not have ratified the Gray Lease by accepting the deed
because, at the time of the conveyance, the legal description was a viola-
tion of the statute of frauds and was thus void. 10 9
The significance of the case is the holding that neither revivor nor rati-
fication will save a lease which is void because of a defective legal
description; it is still void. A description of an unidentified portion of a
larger, identifiable tract, is void as a matter of law.
Migl v. Dominion Oklahoma Texas Exploration & Production, Inc.,110
examined royalty requirements under implied and express covenants of a
gas lease and a long-term gas purchase contract. Lessor filed suit against
lessee for underpayment of royalties. The principal claims were for (1)
breach of the express covenant in the royalty clause requiring lessee to
account for gas sold off the lease at market value and (2) breach of the
duty obligating lessee to obtain the best price reasonably possible under
the implied covenant to manage and administer the lease (duty to
market).111
The lease royalty clause provided:
On gas, including casinghead gas or other gaseous substance, pro-
duced from said land and sold or used off the premises or for the
extraction of gasoline or other product therefrom, the market value
at the well or one-eighth of the gas so sold or used, provided that the
gas sold at the wells the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount
realized from such sale. 112
The uncontroverted evidence showed that all gas was sold at a meter
on the lease, which is a sale "at the wells," and lessee paid royalties based
on proceeds. 1 3 Because the royalty provision required only an amount






109. Id. at *4-5.
110. No. 13-05-589-CV, 2007 WL 475318 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Feb. 15, 2007, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
111. Id. at *2.
112. Id. (quoting the lease) (court's emphasis).
113. Id. at *5 n.4 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1981) as
authority for lease sales being sales "at the wells").
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that lessee did not breach the express lease covenant to pay royalty.1 14
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals identified the specific implied
lease covenant at issue as an alleged breach of the duty to reasonably
market, which is included within the broader duty expressed as the im-
plied covenant to manage and administer the lease.1 1 5 The duty is appli-
cable to amount-realized (proceeds) based royalty clauses, but not to
"market value" royalty clauses.1 1 6 The royalty clause at issue here was
the proceeds clause, and lessor's evidence showed only that the contract
price was below the current market price. 117 Citing the Texas Supreme
Court's holding in Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources, Inc.,1 l8 that the amount
realized from sale proceeds may be unrelated to market value, the court
held that lessee did not breach the reasonably prudent operator standard
because evidence of current market value was not evidence that lessee
failed to act as a reasonably prudent operator.1 1 9 "An action based on
the implied covenant to reasonably market focuses on the behavior of the
lessee rather than on evidence of other sales, and asks whether the lessee
acted as 'a reasonably prudent operator under the same or similar facts
and circumstances.' ,,1
20
The summary judgment for lessee was affirmed because the lessor of-
fered no evidence of negligence or self-dealing.1 21 The only evidence was
that the current market price was higher than the contract price.
122
The significance of the case is that Migl complements Yzaguirre, by
confirming the principle that evidence of current market value will not be
conclusive, and may not even be relevant, in determining whether a
lessee did or did not breach the implied covenant to reasonably market
under a proceeds lease royalty clause.
Chesapeake Exploration Limited Partnership v. Corine Incorporated
23
construed a shut-in royalty clause to determine whether the point in time
when the shut-in well must be "capable of producing in paying quanti-
ties" was (1) at the moment when the well was shut-in, or (2) at the end
of the primary term of the lease.124 While the lease was in its primary
term, an off-lease well was drilled on property adjacent to the lease. In
114. Id. at *5-6.
115. Id. at *6.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 53 S.W.3d 368, 370-73 (Tex. 2001). The court of appeals found Yzaguirre as similar
and controlling (though inverse) to Migl. Yzaguirre involved a claim for breach of implied
covenant when gas was sold off the lease under a contract price higher than market value,
but lessee accounted to lessor based on the lower market value. The court denied the
lessors' contention that the lessee should have accounted for royalty at the above-market
contract price. Id.
119. Migl v. Dominion Ok. Exploration & Prod., Inc. No. 13-05-589-CV,, 2007 WL
475318, at *6 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Feb. 15, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.).
120. Id. (quoting Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Hankins, 111 S.W.3d 69, 71 (Tex.
2003)).
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id. at *6.
123. No. 10-06-00265-CV, 2007 WL 2729576 (Tex. App.-Waco Aug. 29, 2007, no pet.).
124. Id. at *1, 2.
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2002, the well was completed, shut-in, and a gas unit formed which
pooled lessor's property into the unit. The primary term expired on Sep-
tember 4, 2003. There was no activity on the unit well until September of
2004. Lessor sued for declatory judgment that the lease terminated at the
end of the primary term.125 The lease provided:
If at the end of the primary term or any time thereafter one or more
wells on the leased premises or lands pooled therewith are capable of
producing oil or gas or other substances covered hereby in paying
quantities, but such well or wells are either shut in or production
therefrom is not being sold by Lessee, such well or wells shall never-
theless be deemed to be producing in paying quantities for the pur-
pose of maintaining this lease.126
Lessee argued that the trial court erred in finding the lease had termi-
nated because the court failed to consider whether the well was capable
of producing in paying quantities at the time the well was shut-in. 127 The
Waco Court of Appeals held that the intent of the parties could be easily
ascertained. 128 "If at the end of the primary term," were words that man-
ifested the intent that "the time to determine whether the well at issue
was capable of production in paying quantities was at the end of the pri-
mary term. ' 129 Lessee relied on a case decided by the Amarillo Court of
Appeals which held that "for a well to be maintained by the payment of
shut-in royalties, it must be capable of producing gas in paying quantities
at the time it is shut-in.' 130 However, the Waco Court of Appeals pointed
out that the Amarillo Court of Appeals was not deciding the same issue.
The Amarillo Court of Appeals was focused on the meaning of the
phrase "capable of producing in paying quantities," and it was not ad-
dressing the moment in time when the capability to produce was to be
gauged. 31 Moreover, the well in the Amarillo case had been shut in dur-
ing the secondary term and not in the primary term, which made the two
cases factually distinguishable. 132
Having decided that the end of the primary term was the appropriate
time to determine whether the well was capable of production in paying
quantities, the Waco Court of Appeals then examined whether the well
was capable of producing in paying quantities at that time. The court
followed the reasoning of the Amarillo Court of Appeals. "A well is ca-
pable of production if it is capable of producing in paying quantities with-
out additional equipment or repairs."'1 33 If the well is turned "on," and it
125. Id. at *1.
126. Id. at *2 (quoting the lease) (court's emphasis).
127. Id.
128. Id. at *3.
129. Id. at *2-3.
130. Id. at *2 (quoting Hydrocarbon Mgmt. v. Tracker Exploration, 861 S.W.2d 427,
432-33 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ)) (court's emphasis).
131. Id. at *2.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *3 (citing Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex.
2002)).
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begins to flow without additional equipment or repairs then it is capable
of producing in paying quantities.1 3 4 However, if the well is turned "on,"
and the well does not flow because of mechanical problems, or, as in this
case, because the well needed rods, tubing, or pumping equipment, then
the well is not capable of producing in paying quantities.
135
The significance of the case is that it defines the moment in time when
(under this particular common form of shut-in royalty clause) a shut-in
well must be capable of producing in paying quantities. It does not ad-
dress whether the shut-in well must continue to be or continuously be
capable of producing in paying quantities. More fundamentally, the case
highlights the principle that to preserve the lease under a shut-in royalty
clause, lessee must have not only a lease clause and a well which could
produce if fully equipped, but a well capable in fact of producing in pay-
ing quantities at the very moment specified in the lease.
In re Nueces Petroleum Corp.136 is a production in paying quantities
case in which the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas held that the lease could only be extended under three con-
ditions: production in paying quantities, excused performance under
force majeure, or continuous drilling or reworking operations. 137 How-
ever, the court held that none of these three conditions were met and the
lease terminated.1 38
Analyzing the production in paying quantities issue, the court upheld
the lessor's method of cumulating production revenues less operating
costs over multiple months as a reasonable period of time.139 The lessee
contended that the analysis should be monthly, but there was no explana-
tion as to how this could possibly help lessee's case. There were many
months (approximately twenty out of thirty-six) in which there was either
no production or no production in paying quantities.
140
The lease was located in wetlands on the banks of the Lavaca River.
The land could be flooded by high tides, southerly winds, releases from
spillways, and hurricanes. The force majeure clause in the lease extended
to various events such as storm, flood, or other act of God.14 1 Lessee put
on some evidence of the difficulties caused by Hurricane Claudette, al-
though other leases in the area did not suspend operations. The court
held that the burden of proof was on lessee, and that lessee failed to pre-
sent any evidence that should have excused performance under force
majeure, except with respect to Hurricane Claudette.142 The court al-
lowed a brief suspension of lessee's obligations during the period after
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. No. 05-44617, 2007 WL 418889 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2007) (mem. op.).
137. Id. at *4.
138. Id. at *5.
139. Id. at *3.
140. Id. at *34.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *4.
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the hurricane but no other suspensions were allowed.143
Finally, the court held that lessee's claimed continuous operations were
also not enough to preserve the lease as the defendants could not prove
that the operations had been conducted in "good faith and in a workman-
like manner" as required by the lease. 14 4 There was some conflicting wit-
ness testimony, but there was evidence that defendant had halted drilling
operations on a well to avoid paying overtime (resulting in a lost well)
and that forty of the forty-two wells on the lease were noncompliant with
Texas Railroad Commission requirements. Furthermore, there was pho-
tographic evidence of multiple well-site deficiencies (including missing
equipment). The court found the work was neither "workmanlike" nor
competent. 145
El Paso Production Oil & Gas v. Texas State Bank1 46 refused to imply a
horizontal severance into a continuous development clause, after consid-
ering the relationship between the continuous development clause, the
Pugh clause, and other lease clauses. 147 Under two identical leases, lessee
formed four separate pooled units for gas. Each of the pooled gas units
were depth-limited by references to specified top and bottom depth lim-
its. It was uncontroverted that the leases were in effect as to the depths
set out in the four designated gas units. The dispute was centered upon
whether the leases expired as to those depths lying within the surface
boundaries of the gas units, but not included within the specified
depths. 148
Lease paragraph fifteen was an addendum to the printed form which
contained a continuous development clause, and a Pugh-type clause sub-
sumed within the continuous development clause. In summary, para-
graph fifteen provided that upon cessation of continuous operations, the
leases would terminate
except as to lands covered by this lease which are then allocated to a
production unit or included in a pooled unit for a well capable of
producing oil and/or gas in paying quantities (which lands herein shall
be referred to as developed acreage). For the purposes of this para-
graph, a production unit is defined as an area consisting only of lands
covered by this lease and allocated or dedicated to a well in accor-
dance with the Rules and Regulations of the Railroad Commission
of the State of Texas and shall contain only such number of acres as
permitted herein for pooled oil units or pooled gas units.
This lease shall remain in effect as to all depths as to all developed
acreage so long as there is production of oil and/or gas in paying
quantities from said developed acreage. 149
143. Id. at *5.
144. Id. at *5 (quoting the lease).
145. Id.
146. No. 04-05-00673-CV, 2007 WL 752209 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 14, 2007,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
147. Id. at *6.
148. Id. at *1.
149. Id. at *3 (quoting the lease) (court's emphasis).
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The parties agreed that the Pugh-type clause within paragraph fifteen did
not by itself effect a horizontal severance. 150 However, the lessor con-
tended that after the lessee created the gas units through the unit declara-
tions, production from those units had to come from the depths set forth
in lease paragraph thirteen.151 Lease paragraph thirteen was another ad-
dendum paragraph to the printed lease form. It was a variety of a rela-
tively common lease clauses that limits acreage that can be pooled for
gas, so that the permitted size of the unit varies by depth. The clause
provided for units of 160 acres from the surface to 6000 feet below the
surface, 320 acres from 6,000 feet below the surface to 10,000 feet below
the surface, and 640 acres below 10,000 feet below the surface. 152 There-
fore, lessor argued that there could be no well on the 640-acre unit capa-
ble of producing from horizons shallower than 10,000 feet below the
surface. 153
The court found Friedrich v. Amoco Prod. Co.1 54 to be the only Texas
case on point. In Friedrich, the lessee pooled from the surface to a depth
of 1,298 feet. The lessor sued to terminate the lease as to the deep rights,
arguing that the Pugh-type clause in his lease effected both a vertical and
horizontal severance of the leasehold estate. The Friedrich court refused
to imply a horizontal severance, reasoning that the pooling clause pre-
served the lease as to the "land" included in the pooled unit, and that the
word "land" was used throughout the lease to refer to surface acreage. 155
The court in El Paso Production followed the reasoning of the court in
Friedrich and reached the same result. 15 6 Paragraph fifteen of the leases
excluded from the operation of the Pugh-type clause the "lands" in a
pooled unit. The leases used the term "land" or "said lands" in the grant-
ing clause, the habendum clause, the pooling clause, the delay rental
clause, and in other paragraphs in the printed lease form-in each in-
stance referring to surface acreage. The court held that a term is ordina-
rily considered to have been used in the same sense in different parts of
the same instrument, and that the phrase "all depths," as used in lease
paragraph fifteen, would have been unnecessary if "developed acreage"
was intended to be limited to the gas unit as designated by lessee.1
57
The significance of the case is that it illustrates the possible result of the
interaction between a pooling clause and a Pugh clause. It is common for
leases to have some provision which loosely provides that the pooling
clause trumps the Pugh clause. This is generally driven by the need to
harmonize different lease forms and lease provisions in the event that the
leases are pooled. From the lessor's perspective, harmony may not be a
150. Id. at *5 n.5.
151. Id. at *4.
152. Id. at *3.
153. Id. at *4.
154. 698 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
155. El Paso Prod., 2007 WL 752209 at *5 (citing to Friedrich, 698 S.W.2d at 753-54).
156. Id.
157. Id. at *6.
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desired goal, particularly if the pooling does not cross property lines so as
to include other owners with divided interests within the pooled unit.
IV. INDUSTRY CONTRACTS
Boldrick v. BTA Oil Producers158 held that an overriding royalty inter-
est subject to a joint operating agreement ("JOA") and burdening a non-
consenting interest is not payable until costs are recouped under the
JOA. Paragraph 31(b) of the JOA provided that any "subsequently cre-
ated interest" would be subject to all the terms and conditions of the
JOA, and it defined a subsequently created interest to include "an over-
riding royalty created by a working interest owner out of its working in-
terest."'1 59 BTA, a non-operator subject to the JOA, assigned an
overriding royalty to Boldrick, and the assignment provided that the
overriding royalty interest "shall be free and clear of all costs of develop-
ment and operation" and "[t]his Assignment shall not imply any lease-
hold preservation, drilling or development obligation on the part of
Assignor. '160 It was apparently uncontested that Boldrick had notice of
the JOA. 161 BTA then elected to go non-consent on the Stallings Gas
Unit 2H Well, which was drilled and completed.162 Paragraph 31(b) of
the JOA further provided that subsequently created interests were
"chargeable with a pro rata portion of all costs and expenses chargeable
under the [JOA] against a non-consenting interest in the same manner as
if it were a working interest. ' 163 The operator stopped paying Boldrick,
and Boldrick sued BTA for Boldrick's share of production "free and clear
of all costs" on theories of breach of contract, unjust enrichment and
conversion. 164
The Eastland Court of Appeals held that Boldrick's overriding royalty
was created out of BTA's working interest subsequent to the JOA and
the overriding royalty was subject to all the terms and provisions of the
JOA.165 Because BTA went non-consent, Boldrick's overriding royalty
interest was chargeable like a working interest as mandated by the JOA.
Such a use could not constitute a breach of contract between Boldrick
and BTA when that contract was subject to the JOA and it could not
constitute unjust enrichment or conversion. 166 However, the court was
not required and did not address whether BTA would have such a liabil-
ity in the future after all non-consent penalties had been paid and BTA
and Boldrick were receiving payments for their respective interests.167
158. 222 S.W.3d 672 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, no pet.).
159. Id. at 674.
160. Id. at 673.
161. Id. at 675.
162. Id. at 673 (quoting the assignment) (court's alteration).




167. Id. at 674, 675.
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The court reasoned that BTA had no present obligation to pay Bol-
drick for his overriding royalty interest which was currently being used to
discharge the non-consent penalty under paragraph 31(b) of the JOA. 168
The court rejected Boldrick's argument that the overriding royalty was
not a subsequently created interest.169 The overriding royalty was not
included in Exhibit A to the JOA, and it was assigned after the JOA was
executed. 170 Boldrick pointed to the exception in paragraph thirteen of
the JOA for overriding royalty interests, but the court rejected this dis-
tinction because paragraph thirteen pertains to the right to take produc-
tion in-kind and only pertains to overriding royalty interests scheduled on
Exhibit A.171 Moreover, paragraph 31(b) was applicable "[n]otwith-
standing anything herein to the contrary. ' 172 Boldrick argued that even if
the interest BTA relinquished to the operator during payout under the
JOA included Boldrick's overriding royalty interest, BTA was neverthe-
less bound by the specific language of its overriding royalty grant to Bol-
drick.173 The court was unmoved. BTA had no duty to pay anything,
because under the JOA, BTA was getting nothing. Regardless of the
ownership or continuing rights of Boldrick in the production, nothing
could change the fact that Boldrick's interest was expressly chargeable
with a pro rata share of all costs and expenses until payout. 174
The significance of the case is that an assignment of a cost-free overrid-
ing royalty subject to a JOA may assign nothing, if the assignor then goes
non-consent under the JOA. The significance of the case may be limited,
because it does not appear that the JOA litigated was one of the common
American Association of Petroleum Landmen ("AAPL") model form
operating agreements. For example, the AAPL 610-1982 Model Form
Operating Agreement generally requires disclosure of all overriding roy-
alties, fixes a minimum net revenue interest as to all leases subject to the
JOA, and fixes liability for "excess" burdens. Undisclosed and subse-
quently created burdens must be borne by the party contributing the
lease or creating the interest, which is supported by an indemnity. 17 5 Ar-
ticle VI of the model form then provides that "[d]uring the period of time
Consenting Parties are entitled to receive Non-Consenting Party's share
of production... Consenting Parties shall be responsible for the payment
of all . . . overriding royalty ... applicable to Non-Consenting Party's
share of production not excepted by Article III.D.176
EOG Resources, Inc. v. Killam Oil Co., Ltd.177 held that the individual-
168. Id. at 675.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 673, 676.
171. Id. at 675.
172. Id. at 676 (quoting the JOA) (court's alteration).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 677.
175. AAPL FORM 610-1982 MODEL FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT, Art. 111, 7 WEST'S
TEX. FORMS, MINERALS, OIL & GAS § 13.2 (3d ed. 2007).
176. Id. at Art. VI.
177. 239 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. denied).
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loss provision of a JOA operated against the party losing title, regardless
of whether the party acquiring title was a third party or another party to
the JOA.178 The San Antonio Court of Appeals applied the test adopted
in Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson179 for determining whether a
well is capable of producing in paying quantities, when the issue arises
under a retained acreage clause. 180 EOG and Killam were parties to a
JOA governing multiple zones. EOG lost title to some of those zones
under its farmout from Killam. EOG argued that the continuing JOA (by
allocating the right to share in production) created a contractual right in
EOG to share in production from those zones which EOG may have lost
under the applicable farmout agreement. 181
The court recognized that this typical JOA identified the parties' inter-
ests and provided that those interests would continue for so long as any of
the leases subject to the JOA and included in the Contract Area contin-
ued in force. 182 Therefore, the JOA did unambiguously provide that each
party's share of production was based on the percentage of its fractional
interest as shown in the JOA.183 However, the JOA also contained a
typical individual loss provision which provided:
The party whose oil and gas lease or interest is affected by the title
failure shall bear alone the entire loss ... and...
the interests of the parties shall be revised on an acreage basis ... so
that the interest of the party whose lease or interest is affected by the
title failure will thereafter be reduced in the Contract Area by the
amount of the interest lost .... 184
EOG argued that the failure of title provisions should be interpreted as
only applying to failures of title in favor of a third party who was not a
party to the JOA. EOG pointed to certain provisions of the article on
failure of title which were expressly addressed to third parties. The broad
provisions quoted above were not expressly limited to third parties, and
the court refused to read such a limitation into the JOA. The court con-
cluded that when the failure of title is in favor of any party or a non-party
to the JOA, then such "loss [of title] results in a reduction of [the party or
parties] interest from that shown on Exhibit 'A."1 85
EOG also raised as a fact issue the application of the retained acreage
clause in the applicable farmout agreement. The clause preserved 640
acres surrounding each well "which is producing or capable of produc-
ing."'1 86 None of the wells were producing, and the issue played out on
the construction of competing expert witness affidavits and the proper
178. Id. at 300.
179. 94 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. 2002).
180. EOG Res., Inc., 239 S.W.3d at 302-03.
181. Id. at 297.
182. Id. at 298.
183. Id. at 299.
184. Id. (quoting the JOA).
185. Id. at 300 (quoting the JOA) (court's alteration).
186. Id. at 301 (quoting the JOA).
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standard for determining whether any of the wells were "capable of pro-
ducing." EOG contended that the proper standard for analyzing "capa-
ble of producing" could change depending upon the context in which the
phrase is used. 187 The court disagreed and held that the test articulated in
Anadarko Petroleum Corp.188 applied. 189 Because Killam's expert affida-
vit carefully tracked the requirements of the Anadarko test (the well will
not flow when the well switch is turned "on"), the wells in this case were,
as a matter of law, not capable of producing in paying quantities. 19°
The significance of the case is that the very common individual-loss
provision found in many form JOA's is likely to be held to change the
contractual split of the production revenues, even if the person who has
the better title is another party to the JOA. Moreover, this court seems
to hold that unless and until a different standard is articulated for deter-
mining when a well is "capable of producing," the Anadarko standard
will be given universal application.
V. PIPELINES
SouthTex 66 Pipeline Co., Ltd. v. Spoor'9 1 held that a pipeline ease-
ment acquired by WesTTex Pipeline Company by condemnation could be
leased by WesTTex to another pipeline company, SouthTex. 192 The land-
owner contended that a lease is not an "assignment," and that a con-
demned easement cannot be leased to others.193 The easement originally
awarded by the trial court to WesTTex was based on WesTTex's state-
ment that, "[t]he pipeline and any replacement pipeline will be utilized by
WesTT[e]x, and its successors and assigns, as a common carrier pipeline
transporting crude oil and refined petroleum products....
Pipeline easements are assignable in Texas.195 Therefore, unless there
is something specific to establish that an easement cannot be assigned,
Texas law will allow it.196 In this case, the court held that the "successors
and assigns" language was evidence that the easement was assignable. 197
The landowner argued that a lease was not an assignment. The court
relied upon Black's Law Dictionary' 98 for definitions of "lease," "con-
vey," "transfer," and "assignment" to conclude that an assignment is ulti-
mately any mode of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in
an asset.199
187. Id. at 302.
188. 94 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2002).
189. EOG Res., Inc., 239 S.W.3d at 303.
190. Id.
191. 238 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
192. Id. at 548-49.
193. Id. at 546-47, 547.
194. Id. at 541.
195. Id. at 546.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. (8th ed. 2004).
199. Id. at 547-48.
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The court distinguished Calcasieu Lumber Co. v. Harris200 which held,
in part, that an easement acquired for a railroad did not include the right
to lease the land.201 The Southtex court construed that prohibition as lim-
iting the right to lease so as to prohibit a lease for an independent use not
contemplated by the condemnation. 20 2 Here, the lease was valid because
WesTIFex leased the easement to SouthTex for the same purpose as the
original easement as condemned.
Bagley v. Centana Intrastate Pipeline, L.L.C.20 3 held that a pipeline can
be relocated, notwithstanding that the easement granted was an "ease-
ment along a route," with the route defined as the location of the pipeline
"as constructed," and that the route of the pipeline as depicted on Exhibit
A to the easement was the route of the pipeline as constructed in 1987.204
The pipeline company had multiple easements and pipelines crossing
landowner's tract. Line 27 and Line 17 both crossed landowner's tract.
Line 17 entered the processing plant on lands adjacent to landowner's
tract. Line 27, from offshore, did not. To get the offshore gas from Line
27 into the processing plant, the pipeline company cut off part of Line 17,
extended Line 17 by a 105-foot section of new twelve inch pipe to Line
27, and connected Line 27 to Line 17. The landowner sued for injunction,
declaratory relief, and damages for trespass.20 5
The document originally creating the easement in 1987 for Line 17
granted:
• .. a right of way and easement along a route (the location of the
pipelines, as constructed, to evidence such a route) to construct ...
operate... alter, replace, but not enlarge the size of... pipelines...
as depicted on Exhibit A for the transportation of . . . gas . . .
through a pipeline.., through and within that certain pipeline right-
of-way and easement hereinafter set forth across, under and upon
the lands of G[rantor] . . . as hereinafter described.
There is included in this grant the right, from time to time, to...
alter,..., change the size of, but not enlarge the size of the line. The
pipeline to be constructed will be no larger than 12 [inches] in
diameter.20 6
Exhibit A as attached to the 1987 easement depicted the original pipeline
installed in 1987.
The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the pipeline company could
not alter the "size" of the line to something larger than twelve inches, but
that there was no restriction barring the pipeline company from lengthen-
ing the pipeline within the landowner's tract.20 7 It reasoned that the 105-
200. 13 S.W. 453 (1890).
201. Calcasieu, 13 S.W. at 454-55.
202. SouthTex 66 Pipeline Co., 238 S.W.3d at 547.
203. No. 09-06-063-CV, 2007 WL 846554 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Mar. 22, 2007, pet.
denied) (mem. op.).
204. Id. (quoting the agreement).
205. Id. at *1
206. Id. (quoting the agreement) (alteration by author).
207. Id. at *4.
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foot section was "entirely within the easement."'20 8
The concurring opinion argued that the easement granted was along a
"route" that the existing pipeline followed "as depicted" on Exhibit A to
the easement.2 0 9 Given that the easement did not expressly grant the
right to lay additional lines, the court should not imply such rights.2 10
However, because the landowner's only issues preserved on appeal con-
cerned the trespass claim, and the case was properly in contract and not
in tort, this justice concurred in the judgment.211
The concurring opinion is well-reasoned, and better for Texas and the
industry. There are thousands of easements of record that are similar to
the one in this case. At the time those easements were granted, neither
the landowner nor the pipeline company may have known exactly how
the easement would actually turn out "as constructed." The bargained
for consideration generally would have involved one pipeline across
Blackacre, and the landowner may not have particularly cared to exactly
define the location before it was built. The pipeline company did not
want to have to amend all of its easements after construction to reflect
the specific path taken by the pipeline. Many of these easements effec-
tively grant an easement along a route defined by the pipeline as con-
structed. But after the pipeline is actually constructed, all parties have an
interest in knowing exactly where that easement is located. The pipeline
company would not have wanted anything to harm or interfere with its
pipeline. The landowner wants to be free to enjoy the rest of Blackacre
without having to assume the pipeline may be relocated. This particular
case would have been more interesting if an intervening bona fide pur-
chaser for value, perhaps a retired appellate judge, had constructed a
$1,000,000 house with a large and deep swimming pool on the site of the
proposed 105-foot "extension."
VI. REGULATIONS
City of Mont Belvieu v. Enterprise Products Operating, LP2 12 held that
the Legislature did not intend to fully preempt a municipality's authority
to regulate underground salt dome hydrocarbon storage facilities. 21 3 Ab-
solute preemption was not intended because it would have given the
Texas Railroad Commission ("TRRC") exclusive authority over these fa-
cilities and barred enforcement of city permit ordinances in the district
court. 214 Enterprise was granted a permit to operate an underground hy-
drocarbon storage facility by the TRRC, after a lengthy process in which
the City of Mont Belvieu (the "City") participated. The TRRC then
granted Enterprise a permit to drill a well to access the facility. Enter-
208. Id.
209. Id. at *5.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. 222 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 2007, no pet.).




prise began drilling operations without obtaining a drilling permit from
the City.2 15 The City brought claims for temporary and permanent in-
junction for damages against Enterprise, alleging Enterprise's drilling vio-
lated city ordinances and constituted a nuisance.216
The Fourteenth District Houston Court of Appeals first held that the
City's enforcement of its ordinances requiring a permit to drill was not a
collateral attack on the validity of the TRRC permits because the City
did not seek to contradict or overturn them; the City sought to impose
additional requirements. 217
The court then addressed the extent to which Chapter 211 of the Texas
Natural Resources Code might preempt a municipality's authority re-
garding salt dome storage facilities, or limit the district court's subject
matter jurisdiction. Chapter 211 of the Code, under jurisdiction provides
in part: "[TRRC] has jurisdiction over all salt dome storage of hazardous
liquids and over salt dome storage facilities used for the storage of haz-
ardous liquids. '218 Furthermore, under "Powers of Local Governments,"
the code provides:
(a) This chapter does not reduce, limit, or impair the authority pro-
vided by law to any municipality, except as provided by Subsec-
tion (b) of this section.
(b) A municipality or county may not adopt or enforce an ordi-
nance or other regulation that establishes safety standards or
practices applicable to hazardous liquid salt formation storage
facilities that are subject to regulation by federal or state law.
(c) "Safety standards or practices" means any regulation of an ac-
tivity or facility covered by this chapter or that is incompatible
with the safety standards or practices enacted or adopted by
federal or state government pursuant to The Hazardous Liquid
Pipeline Safety Act of 1979, as amended.219
"For a state statute to preempt a subject matter usually encompassed
by municipal authority, the statute must do so with unmistakable clar-
ity."'220 Notwithstanding Chapter 211's reservation of certain powers to
the TRRC, section 211.002 of the Natural Resources Code specifically
preserves a municipality's authority. Also, the phrase "safety standards
or practices" has a specific, limited meaning in chapter 211, which "does
not include all actions a municipality might take regarding a salt dome or
even all matters related to safety. '221
Thus, the City's permit process was not preempted by TRRC's permit
process. The grant of jurisdiction to the TRRC in section 211.011 merely
215. Id. at 517.
216. Id. at 517-18.
217. Id. at 519.
218. Id. at 521 (quoting TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 211.011 (Vernon 2001)).
219. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 211.002 (Vernon 2001).
220. City of Mont Belview, 222 S.W.3d at 520.
221. Id. at 521.
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gives the TRRC jurisdiction, not exclusive jurisdiction.222 "Accordingly,
this case does not present an issue of forum preemption, but instead a
question of choice of law preemption, which does not operate as a juris-
dictional bar to the City's claims. '223 The district court, having general
jurisdiction, could "determine whether, and to what extent, the ordi-
nances at issue are preempted by the Legislature's grant of regulatory
authority to TRRC. 224
As municipalities continue to expand, and oil and gas operations en-
croach on urban areas, mixed land use controversies and conflicts in regu-
latory powers are bound to increase. An increasingly urbanized Texas,
combined with a decrease in the relative economic importance of the oil
and gas industry in Texas, suggest that the trend is likely to be toward
more regulatory restrictions on operations.
In re Discovery Operating, Inc.22 5 held that the TRRC does not have
exclusive or primary jurisdiction over claims for negligence, negligence
per se, or common law and statutory waste.226 The claims arose from
defendant BP America Production Company's ("BP") use of two
saltwater injection wells in the vicinity of Discovery's oil and gas lease.
The trial court abated the judicial proceeding and referred the matter to
the TRRC.227
"[W]hether an agency has exclusive or primary jurisdiction is a ques-
tion of law."'228 "An agency has exclusive jurisdiction when the legisla-
ture has granted to it the sole authority to make an initial determination
in a dispute, [i.e.], when a pervasive regulatory scheme indicates that the
legislature intended for the regulatory process to be the exclusive means
of remedying the problem. ' 229 BP relied upon the Texas Natural Re-
sources Code and the Texas Water Code in claiming that the TRRC had
exclusive jurisdiction over underground injection control.
There are provisions in the Texas Natural Resources Code that pre-
serve a private cause of action:
§ 85.321. Suit for Damages
A party who owns an interest in property or production that may be
damaged by another party violating the provisions of this chapter
that were formerly a part of Chapter 26, Acts of the 42nd Legisla-
ture, 1st Called Session, 1931, as amended, or another law of this
state prohibiting waste or a valid rule or order of the railroad com-
mission may sue for and recover damages and have any other relief
to which he may be entitled at law or in equity. Provided, however,
that in any action brought under this section or otherwise, alleging
waste to have been caused by an act or omission of a lease owner or
222. Id. at 522.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 216 S.W.3d 898 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, orig. proceeding).
226. Id. at 901, 903-04.
227. Id. at 901.




operator, it shall be a defense that the lease owner or operator was
acting as a reasonably prudent operator would act under the same or
similar facts and circumstances.
§ 85.322. Proceedings Not to Impair Suit for Damages
None of the provisions of this chapter that were formerly a part of
Chapter 26, Acts of the 42nd Legislature, 1st Called Session, 1931, as
amended, no suit by or against the railroad commission, and no pen-
alties imposed on or claimed against any party violating a law, rule,
or order of the commission shall impair or abridge or delay a cause
of action for damages or other relief that an owner of land or a pro-
ducer of oil or gas, or any other party at interest, may have or assert
against any party violating any rule or order of the commission or
any judgment under this chapter. 230
Although the Texas Natural Resources Code does provide a pervasive
regulatory scheme, the court found these specific provisions preserving
the private cause of action to be more persuasive. 231 The court reached
the same conclusion as to the Texas Water Code.232
The primary jurisdiction doctrine allocates power between courts and
agencies.233 Courts will defer to the administrative agency when "(1) an
agency is typically staffed with experts trained in handling the complex
problems in the agency's purview; and (2) great benefit is derived from an
agency's uniformly interpreting its laws, rules, and regulations. 234
The court held that the primary jurisdiction doctrine does not apply to
actions or disputes that are "inherently judicial in nature. '235 The causes
of action asserted in this case-negligence, negligence per se, and
waste-were inherently judicial in nature.236 In addition, the court was
persuaded that applying the judicially created doctrine of primary juris-
diction would be in direct contravention of the specific language in Texas
Natural Resource Code section 85.322, as quoted above, that a cause of
action for damages or other relief shall not be impaired, abridged, or
delayed. 237
The significance of the case is that the court gives strong deference to
the statutory provisions preserving the right to litigate, rather than to the
administrative expertise of the Railroad Commission of Texas (the
"TRRC").
Seagull Energy E&P, Inc. v. Railroad Commission of Texas238 held that
a mineral owner's property right to commingled oil or gas or both ex-
tends collectively to the commingled whole rather than separately to each
230. TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 85.321, 85.322 (Vernon 2001).
231. Discovery Operating Inc., 216 S.W.3d at 903.
232. Id.





238. 226 S.W.3d 383 (Tex. 2007).
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commingled deposit.239 The TRRC's field rules are not applied sepa-
rately to each strata (or sand) in a commingled field, and an operator can
prove an unconstitutional taking only by proving confiscation (drainage)
from the reservoir as a whole, rather than from an individual, commin-
gled sand.240
"[C]ommingling occurs when one or more otherwise separate strata or
accumulations of hydrocarbons are simultaneously produced through the
same string of pipe in the well[ ]bore. '' 241 A "sand" in oil and gas usage
loosely refers to an area known to contain oil or gas or both.2 42 "When
sands are discontinuous it is difficult to correlate the distinct zones
throughout the area, meaning that a producer may be able to complete a
well into a particular sand that its adjacent neighbors cannot and vice-
versa. '243 Multiple sands might or might not be in communication and
thus might or might not be a single reservoir.244 Sands which do not nat-
urally communicate with each other may be treated as one reservoir
when the TRRC authorizes commingled production. 245 Commingling
may be beneficial by extending the life of sands too small to justify sepa-
rate wells or whose pressure is too low to support extraction. 246
In this case, involving the Waskom (Cotton Valley) Field, there were
twelve commingled sands, and a producer could complete a well in any
number of sands found on its property. 247 The field rules required eighty
acres for one well and at least 1,320 feet between wells completed in or
drilling to the same reservoir on the same lease.248
Seagull owned a 115.64 acre lease in the Waskom Field. Beneath
Seagull's lease were three vertically separate sands: the "Stroud," the
"C," and the "Taylor." Seagull completed one well into the C Sand in
1991, and in 2000, Seagull was granted a permit to complete a new well in
all three sands.249 Because Seagull did not have sufficient acreage to sup-
port two wells, and because its two wells were only 1,200 feet apart,
Seagull could not produce both wells without an exception to spacing and
density rules.250 Because concurrent production would violate the Was-
kom special field rules, Seagull shut-in the first well before production
began from the new well. Although the new well was successfully com-
pleted in the Stroud and Taylor sands, it was not successfully completed
in the C Sand. Seagull then sought a permit from the TRRC to reopen
the first well, so it could produce from the C Sand. The TRRC denied the
239. Id. at 387-88
240. Id. at 388.
241. Id. at 384 n.1.
242. Id. at 385 n.4.
243. Id. at 385 n.2.
244. Id. at 385 n.4.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 390 n.11.
247. Id. at 385 n.2.
248. Id. at 385 n.5.
249. Id. at 384-85.
250. Id. at 385 n.5.
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permit after concluding that Seagull was not entitled to an exception from
the special field rules, because Seagull had not shown confiscation or
drainage from the commingled reservoir as a whole.251
Seagull argued that the TRRC's refusal to allow it to produce from the
C Sand amounted to an unconstitutional taking of Seagull's gas. Seagull
claimed it had a vested property right in each gas deposit under its
land.252 The TRRC responded that there was not a taking because the
three gas deposits were commingled into one common reservoir in which
Seagull had a permitted and producing well. The confiscation must be
from the whole reservoir, and not from an individual sand.253
The issue was whether a property owner's right to commingled oil and
gas extends separately to each deposit or to the commingled whole.
254
The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that while "a mineral owner has
the right to its fair share of the minerals on and under its property, the
right does not extend to specific oil and gas beneath the property. 2
55
Based on the record before it, the supreme court determined that the
TRRC's actions did not amount to a taking because Seagull failed to
show that concurrent production from both wells was necessary to pre-
vent drainage to the common reservoir.256
The significance of the case is the holding that within a commingled
field there can be no confiscatory taking unless there is a showing that
there is drainage to the common reservoir. Proof of drainage of a partic-
ular sand within that reservoir will not suffice. The TRRC may consider
the commingled deposits as though they are one reservoir when regulat-
ing drilling and production in the commingled field.
VII. ETHICS
Robertson v. ADJ Partnership, Ltd.257 held that an attorney and
landman had to disgorge profits in the form of money and overriding
royalties obtained in breach of fiduciary duty.258 Attorney Bill McGraw
had a long history of representing his wife's family and doing deals with
his wife's family. This included representing and doing various oil and
gas deals with his father-in-law, David Henderson, and brother-in-law,
Abel Adams; eventually probating his father-in-law and mother-in-law's
estates; and representing his sister-in-law, Virginia Adams, after she was
widowed.259 The family had a history of keeping their properties to-
gether in partnerships. This suit was brought by Virginia Adams and a
related partnership against her brother-in-law attorney Bill McGraw,
251. Id. at 385.
252. Id. at 387.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 388-89.
256. Id. at 390.
257. 204 S.W.3d 484 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, pet. denied).
258. Id. at 495.
259. Id. at 486-87.
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landman John L. Robertson, and McGraw and Robertson's affiliated en-
tity, Sibling "A", Inc.260
McGraw and Robertson had known each other for a long time. In
1993, McGraw helped Robertson form several entities that Robertson
could use to conceal his identity when acquiring leases for clients who
wanted to conceal their involvement. One of those entities formed was
the defendant, Sibling "A." McGraw was the president of Sibling "A."
No leases were ever run through Sibling "A," except the leases granted
by the Henderson Family Partnership involved in this suit.26 1
Robertson was leasing independently as a broker for Marathon Oil
Company. His supervisor at Marathon was Wayland Crawley.262 Rob-
ertson sometimes paid Crawley to make it appear Marathon was inter-
ested in a lease when Marathon was not, which assisted Robertson in
selling the lease to another party. "Some of the money was paid to Craw-
ley's teen-aged [sic] daughter, who did nothing for the money. '263
The series of transactions involved in this case began with a Marathon
deal and varied in the details, but followed a similar pattern. The general
pattern was that McGraw secured his sister-in-law's commitment to a spe-
cific bonus and royalty. Robertson then found a better deal. The leases
were then run through Sibling "A" at the lower consideration, and Mc-
Graw and Robertson captured the higher bonus and overriding royalties
through Sibling "A." McGraw did not disclose to his sister-in-law (Ad-
ams) that he was the president of Sibling "A" or that he was receiving
more than her. The transactions included a "commission" to Wayland
Crawley and the documents and manipulating of documents to conceal
the relationships of the parties. Crawley's daughter eventually received
some of the funds, and when the transactions moved on from Marathon
to other oil companies, Crawley continued to get a cut.264
Adams sued for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty and won a jury
verdict. McGraw settled; but Robertson appealed. 265 Robertson con-
tended that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding
that a relationship of trust existed between McGraw and Adams. He
contended that Adams' 1990 letter to McGraw (after a fee dispute) that
McGraw must notify her in advance of any fees to be charged and Ad-
ams' limited use of McGraw after Abel's death on a few unrelated mat-
ters, showed that there was no fiduciary relationship.2 66 The Beaumont
Court of Appeals first noted that a "fiduciary duty arises as a matter of
law in formal attorney-client and trustee relationships. '267 Therefore, to
the extent McGraw represented Adams on these transactions, a fiduciary
260. Id. at 487.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 487-88.
264. See id. at 490-91.
265. Id. at 486.
266. Id. at 487, 492.
267. Id. at 491.
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relationship existed, and to the extent McGraw acted as escrow agent, a
formal duty of disclosure arose.268 The court did not seem sure whether
McGraw did or did not represent Adams, but Adams had no other coun-
sel and McGraw made it appear their interests were identical. 269 It was
clear on the record that the funds were generally run through McGraw's
escrow account.
270
Moreover, the court was strongly persuaded that the evidence sup-
ported a finding of a fiduciary relationship based on personal relation-
ships. The court found that the relationship in this case met the test that
"the special relationship of trust and confidence must exist prior to, and
apart from, the agreement made the basis of the suit."'271 The court
pointed to McGraw's own perception of the relationship by referring to a
letter McGraw wrote. "The letter referred to McGraw's promise that he
made to his [father-in-law Henderson], on Henderson's death bed, invok-
ing the same promise made by Henderson to Henderson's own father,
'that I would, as he did, look after the family properties to the benefit of
all concerns. This I have done."
272
The court also summarily dismissed Robertson's contention that the
evidence was insufficient to show that Robertson and Sibling "A" aided
and abetted McGraw in the breach of fiduciary duty.273 Likewise, the
court rejected Robertson's contention that he could not have committed
fraud because he never had any direct communication with Adams.
274
The court cited to the recent well-known case of In re Arthur Anderson
LLP2 75 for the principle that "each party to a fraudulent scheme is re-
sponsible for the acts of the other participants done in furtherance of the
scheme and is liable for fraud.
276
The court confirmed that disgorgement of profits was the appropriate
remedy for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.277 Robertson was re-
quired to give up his cash compensation and his overriding royalties.
278
The significance of the case is that, notwithstanding the egregious facts,
the lawyer who represents family members always assumes a larger risk,
and a lawyer who uses his escrow account to facilitate a transaction as-
sumes a duty of disclosure. For a landman working with an attorney, the
case illustrates how the attorney's more onerous duty may extend to the
landman who knowingly works with the attorney on a transaction ulti-
mately found to be in breach of that duty.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 492.
270. Id. at 491.
271. Id. at 491-92 (quoting Associated Indem. Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 964
S.W.2d 276, 288 (Tex. 1998)).
272. Id. at 492 (quoting the letter).
273. Id. at 493.
274. Id. at 493-94.
275. 121 S.W.3d 471 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding).
276. Robertson, 204 S.W.3d at 494 (quoting Anderson, 121 S.W.3d at 481).
277. Id. at 495.
278. Id.
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VIII. LEGISLATION
Act: Act of May 8, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 210, §§ 1-3, 2007 Tex.
Gen. Laws 297 (Vernon). 279 (HB 630)
Issue: Relating to notice to a surface owner by an oil or gas well oper-
ator of the issuance of a permit for certain oil and gas operations.
Summary: This act requires the operator of an oil or gas well to give
written notice to the surface owner of the tract of land on which a well is
(or is proposed to be) located no later than the fifteenth business day
after the date the TRRC issues the permit to drill a new oil or gas well or
reenter a plugged and abandoned oil or gas well. The act defines a "sur-
face owner" as the first person shown on the appraisal roll of the ap-
praisal district for the county in which a tract of land is located as owning
an interest in the surface estate of the land.
The applicability of the act is limited to the drilling of a new oil or gas
well or the reentry of a plugged and abandoned oil or gas well. The act
does not extend to the plugging back, reworking, sidetracking, or deepen-
ing of an existing oil or gas well that has not been plugged or abandoned
or the use of a surface location that is the site of an existing oil or gas well
that has not been plugged or abandoned to drill a horizontal well.
Under the act, operators are not required to give notice to a surface
owner if the operator and surface owner have entered into an agreement
which contains alternative notice provisions or the surface owner has
waived his right to notice in writing.
An operator's failure to give notice under the act does not affect any
existing or future permit(s) issued by the TRRC nor does it affect the
operator's right to develop the mineral estate in the land.
Effective: September 1, 2007.
2. Act: Act of May 25, 2007, 80th Leg. R.S., ch. 523, §§ 1-2, 2007
Tex. Gen. Laws 925 (Vernon). 280 (S.B. 714)
Issue: Relating to reports regarding certain water wells required by a
groundwater conservation district.
Summary: This act provides that a Groundwater Conservation Dis-
trict ("GWCD") may require that records are kept and reports are pre-
pared regarding the drilling, equipping, and completing of water wells
and the production and use of groundwater.
The act authorizes a GWCD to adopt rules that require an owner or
operator of a water well which is required to be registered with or permit-
ted by the district to report groundwater withdrawals using appropriate
reporting methods. The act allows reporting exemptions for owners or
279. Codified as an amendment to subch. P., ch. 91 Tex. Nat. Res. Code, adding§§ 91.701, 91.702, 91.703, 91.704, and 91.705 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
*Portions of the legislative section of this Article were supplied to the author by Ben
Sebree, Vice-President for Governmental Affairs, Texas Oil & Gas Association, Austin,
Texas.
280. Codified as an amendment to TEX. WATER CODE § 36.111(a), adding § 36.111(b)(Vernon 2008 & Supp. 2008).
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operators of a well used solely for domestic use or for wells providing
water for livestock or poultry on a tract of land larger than ten acres that
is either drilled, completed, or equipped so that it is incapable of produc-
ing more than 25,000 gallons of groundwater a day.
Effective: June 16, 2007.
3. Act: Act of May 26, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1321, §§ 1-3, 2007
Tex. Gen. Laws 4471 (Vernon).281 (S.B. 1383)
Issue: Relating to district hearings and citizen suits for illegally drill-
ing or operating a water well.
Summary: This act declares that drilling or operating well(s) without
a required permit or producing groundwater in violation of a GWCD's
rule is deemed illegal, wasteful per se, and a nuisance.
This act provides that a landowner or other person rightfully producing
groundwater from land that is adjacent to the land on which well(s) are
drilled or operated without the necessary permit(s); from which ground-
water is produced in violation of GWCD rules, or who own the right to
produce groundwater from land lying within one-half mile of the well(s),
may sue the owner of the well(s) in a court of competent jurisdiction to
restrain the illegal drilling, operating, or both. The aggrieved party may
also sue the owner of the water well(s) for damages and injuries suffered
as a result of the illegal operation or production and other relief for which
the party may be entitled. The existence of well(s) drilled without a re-
quired permit or the operation of well(s) in violation of GWCD rules is
prima facie evidence of illegal drainage.
The act requires the aggrieved party to file a written complaint with the
GWCD having jurisdiction over the well(s) drilled or operated without a
permit or in violation of a GWDC rule before filing suit in court. Ac-
cording to the act, the GWCD having jurisdiction over the matter shall
investigate the complaint and after notice and a hearing, which must oc-
cur no later than the 90th day after the date the written complaint was
received by the GWCD, shall determine whether a GWCD rule has been
violated. The act states that an aggrieved party may only file suit on or
after the ninety-first day after the date the written complaint was received
by the GWCD.
The act allows an aggrieved party to sue a well owner or well driller to
restrain the drilling or completion of an illegal well after filing the written
complaint with the GWCD without the need to wait for a hearing con-
cerning the matter.
Effective: June 15, 2007.
4. Act: Act of May 25, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1201, §§ 1-7, 2007
Tex. Gen. Laws 4072 (Vernon).28 2 (H.B. 1495).
281. Codified as amendments to TEX. WATER CODE §§ 36.119(a), 36.119(b), 36.119(c),
adding §§ 36.119(g), 36.119(h) (Vernon 2008 & Supp. 2008).
282. Codified as an amendment to TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. ch. 402, adding § 402.031
(Vernon Supp. 2008), amending TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.012, adding § 21.0112
(Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2008).
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Issue: Relating to a bill of rights for property owners whose property
may be acquired by governmental or private entities through the use of
eminent domain authority.
Summary: The act requires the Attorney General to prepare an easily
understood written statement that includes a bill of rights for a property
owner whose real property may be acquired by a government or private
entity through the use of the entity's eminent domain authority. The
statement must be available to the public on the Attorney General's
website.
The Attorney General's statement must include the title, "Landowner's
Bill of Rights" and a description of the following items:
(1) the condemnation procedure provided in the Property Code
(chapter 21),
(2) the condemning entity's obligations to the property owner, and
(3) the property owner's options during a condemnation, including
the property owner's right to object to and appeal the amount
of damages awarded.
The landowner's bill of rights must notify each property owner that the
owner has the right to:
(1) notice of the proposed acquisition of the owner's property,
(2) a bona fide good faith effort to negotiate by the entity propos-
ing to acquire the property,
(3) an assessment of damages to the owner that will result from the
taking of the property,
(4) a hearing, including a hearing on the assessment of damages,
and
(5) an appeal of a judgment in a condemnation proceeding, includ-
ing an appeal of an assessment of damages.
The act requires a government entity or private entity with eminent
domain authority to send a landowner's bill of rights statement by first
class mail or otherwise provide the statement before it begins the negotia-
tion process with a property owner to acquire real property. The state-
ment must be provided to the person whose name is listed on the most
recent tax rolls of any appropriate taxing unit authorized to levy taxes
against the property.
Effective: February 1, 2008.
5. Act: Act of May 23, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 696, §§ 1-3, 2007
Tex. Gen. Laws 1321 (Vernon). 283 (H.B. 1920)
Issue: Relating to the remedies available in connection with certain
disputes between producers of natural gas and persons who gather or
transport the gas.
Summary: This act provides that a producer is entitled to submit a
written request for an explanation of any loss or inability to account for
283. Codified as amendment to subch. C, ch. 85, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE, adding § 85.065(Vernon Supp. 2008).
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the gas tendered from a person who gathers or transports gas for the
producer. The act specifies what the producer may ask how and when a
response should be made by the gas gatherer or transporter, and what
should be included in the response.
The act provides that a producer may file an informal complaint with
the TRRC against a person who gathers or transports gas for the pro-
ducer if the gatherer or transporter provides an inadequate explanation
of any loss or inability to account for the gas or fails to provide an expla-
nation for lost or unaccounted gas. The act specifies the requirements for
an informal complaint by a producer and states that an informal com-
plaint may not be filed by a producer before the thirtieth day after the
end of the production period covered by the complaint. The act also es-
tablishes a fourteen day deadline for the person who gathered or trans-
ported the gas to provide to the producer and the TRRC an accounting of
the gas tendered during the production period covered by the complaint.
The act states how the accounting may be provided and the elements that
should be included in the accounting.
The act authorizes the Railroad Commission to grant a time extension
for the required accounting from a person who gathered or transported
the gas. However, the extension may not permit the accounting to be
provided later than the forty-fifth day after the date the informal com-
plaint was filed.
The act states that if the person who gathered or transported the gas
does not have the necessary information for the required accounting, the
person must supply a written explanation to the producer and the TRRC
regarding the reason the gatherer or transporter does not possess the nec-
essary information.
The act makes it clear that if a person who gathered or transported the
gas fails to provide the required accounting, the informal complaint filed
by the producer will be considered valid.
If a producer's complaint is considered valid or the TRRC determines
the gas gatherer or transporter committed waste, the act authorizes the
TRRC to take any action it considers appropriate to prevent waste.
The act only applies to a producer and a person who gathers or trans-
ports gas for the producer under a contract entered into or renewed be-
tween the parties on or after September 1, 2007.
The act authorizes a producer, upon written request, to audit the books
and records of the person who gathers or transports gas for the sole pur-
pose of verifying whether the lost or unaccounted gas has been allocated
to the volume of gas tendered as required under the contract. The pro-
ducer is limited to one annual audit.
Effective: September 1, 2007.
[Vol. 61
Oil, Gas and Mineral Law
6. Act: Act of May 23, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 757, §§ 1-2, 2007
Tex. Gen. Laws 1566 (Vernon) 284 (H.B. 3273)
Issue: Relating to the powers and duties of the TRRC of Texas; pro-
viding an administrative penalty.
Summary: This act authorizes the TRRC, after notice and opportu-
nity for a hearing, to impose an administrative penalty against a pur-
chaser, transporter, gatherer, shipper, or seller of natural gas, or any
other entity under the jurisdiction of the TRRC which the TRRC deter-
mines has (1) violated a TRRC rule adopting standards or a code of con-
duct for entities in the natural gas industry prohibiting unlawful
discrimination, or (2) unreasonably discriminated against a seller of natu-
ral gas in the purchase of natural gas.
This act also authorizes the TRRC, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, to impose an administrative penalty against a purchaser, trans-
porter, or gatherer of natural gas if the TRRC determines the person
engaged in prohibited discrimination against a shipper or seller of natural
gas because of a formal or informal complaint filed with the TRRC by the
shipper or seller.
Under the act, the TRRC has the authority, after notice and opportu-
nity for a hearing, to impose an administrative penalty against a pur-
chaser, transporter, gatherer, shipper, or seller of natural gas who is a
party to an informal complaint resolution proceeding and has failed to
participate in the proceeding or failed to provide the information re-
quested by the mediator of the proceeding.
The act clarifies that any administrative penalty imposed under this
section may not exceed $5,000.00 a day for each violation.
As long as there is notice and opportunity for a hearing, this act autho-
rizes the TRRC to issue any necessary order to prevent an entity from
engaging in continued discrimination.
The act allows the TRRC to appoint a commission staff member as the
mediator of an informal complaint with the TRRC. The act also states
the parties may agree to employ and pay an independent mediator to
mediate the complaint. The act does not prohibit the TRRC from requir-
ing parties to participate in a formal complaint resolution proceeding, and
on an annual basis, the TRRC must notify producers of the existence of
the informal complaint resolution process.
The act provides that a confidentiality provision may not be required in
a contract in which a producer is a party for the sale, transportation, or
gathering of natural gas entered into on or after September 1, 2007.
The act authorizes the TRRC to set a transportation or gathering rate
in a formal rate proceeding if TRRC determines the rate is necessary to
remedy unreasonable discrimination in transportation or gathering ser-
284. Codified as an amendment to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ch. 81, adding §§ 81.058,
81.059, 81.060, 81.061 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
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vices. The TRRC may use a cost-of-service method or a market-based
rate method in setting a rate in a formal rate proceeding.
Effective: September 1, 2007.
7. Act: Act of May 25, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 911, §§ 1-6, 2007
Tex. Gen. Laws 2297 (Vernon)28 5 (H.B. 2982)
Issue: Relating to the ad valorem tax appraisal of oil or gas interests.
Summary: This act modifies the existing act by adding a new market
condition factor to acknowledge the Comptroller's current year price
forecast for oil and gas in the current year of a property tax appraisal.
The current year appraisal will reflect the price of oil or gas in the prior
year multiplied by the new market condition factor. The act states the
Comptroller will calculate the market condition factor by dividing the
statewide average price for the severance tax revenue estimate for the
current year by the statewide average price for severance tax in the prior
year. The act also states that the Comptroller must calculate the actual
statewide average prices for oil and gas and the market condition factors
for oil and gas for the prior year, and publish the information for ad
valorem tax appraisal purposes concurrently with the forecasted average
oil and gas prices for the current year.
For property tax purposes, this act allows an owner of portable drilling
rigs to have the equipment's situs be the location of the equipment on
January 1, if the owner elects to render the portable drilling rig to the
appraisal district for that particular location. If the owner makes this
election, then the owner's portable drilling rigs will be taxable at their
location as of January 1. If the owner does not have a place of business in
Texas, the portable drilling rig is taxable by each taxing unit in which the
rig is located on January 1.
Effective: January 1, 2008.
8. Act: Act of May 21, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 816, §§ 1-8, 2007
Tex. Gen. Laws 1691 (Vernon)28 6 (S.B. 1670)
Issue: Relating to certificates of compliance issued by the TRRC to
owners or operators of certain wells subject to the jurisdiction of the
commission.
Summaries: This act expands the statutes, rules, orders, permits, or
certificates for which an owner or operator of any well subject to the
jurisdiction of the TRRC must certify compliance to get a TRRC certifi-
cate of compliance to include Section 26.131 of the Water Code (protec-
tion of surface and subsurface water), and Subchapter C, Chapter 27 of
the Water Code (oil and gas waste).
The act also provides that an operator of a pipeline cannot connect
with any well under the jurisdiction of the TRRC until the well owner or
285. Codified as amendments to TEX. TAX CODE §§ 21.02(e), 23.175(a), adding
§ 162.227 (Vernon 2008 & Supp. 2008).
286. Codified as an amendment and redisignated as subch. P, ch. 91, Tex. Nat. Res.
Code, adding §§ 91.701, 91.702, 91.703, 91.704, 91.705, 91.706, 91.707, amending §§ 85.3855,
86.004, 91.111, 91.114, 91.142, 101.003 (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2008).
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operator furnishes a certificate from the TRRC that the owner or opera-
tor has complied with the necessary rules, orders, licenses, or permits.
The act states that if an operator uses or reports use of a well for pro-
duction, injection, or disposal, for which the operator's certificate of com-
pliance has been cancelled, the TRRC may refuse to renew the operator's
organization report until the operator pays the required fees for reissu-
ance of the certificate and the TRRC issues the necessary certificate of
compliance required for the well.
Effective: September 1, 2007.
9. Act: Act of May 17, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 305, §§ 1-2, 2007
Tex. Gen. Laws 581 (Vernon) 28 7 (H.B. 1787)
Issue: Relating to the determination of title to real property through
a declaratory judgment.
Summary: This act provides that a person may obtain a declaratory
judgment relating to lands, tenements, or other real property when the
sole issue regarding the title to real property is the determination of the
proper boundary line between adjoining properties, notwithstanding the
property code provision that a trespass to try title action is the method of
determining title to lands, tenements, or other real property.
Effective: June 15, 2007.
10. Act: Act of May 21, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 819, §§ 1-2, 2007
Tex. Gen. Laws 1695 (Vernon)28 8 (S.B. 1781)
Issue: Relating to technical defects in instruments conveying real
property.
Summary: This act provides that a person with a right of action for
the recovery of real property or an interest in real property conveyed by
an instrument with certain defects must bring suit no later than two years
after the day the instrument was filed of record with the county clerk of
the county where the property is located. The act modifies the time pe-
riod in which a suit must be brought from four to two years.
The act also provides that an instrument affecting real property and
containing a ministerial defect, omission, or informality in the certificate
of acknowledgment will be lawfully recorded and the public will be on
notice of the existence of the instrument on and after the date the instru-
ment is filed as long as the instrument has been filed of record for longer
than two years in the county where the property is located.
Effective: June 15, 2007.
287. Codified as an amendment to TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.004, adding
§ 37.004(c) (Vernon 2008).
288. Codified as an amendment to TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE §16.033(a), adding
§ 16.033(c) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
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